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Preliminary Memorandum
Conference for December 5, 1975
List 1, Sheet 3
Cert. to CA6 (Miller, Taylor (sitting
by designation)*

No. 75-536-CFX
NASHVILLE GAS CO.

Federal/Civil

v.

Timely

SA TTY
1. Surnmaryo

Petitioner challenges CA6's invalidation of

two of its employment policies relating to the treatment of
pregnant women.

*Judge Engel was listed as a member of the panel that heard
this case but he did not participate in the consideration of the
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2. Facts.
by petitioner.

Respon ent became pregnant while she was employea
Pursuant to company regulations, she was forced

to take a leave of abs ence 25 days before the expected birth
date of her child.

This forced leave of absence is not at issue.

Petitioner provides each employee with a number of sick
leave days based on seniority. Pregnant employees who are
on maternity leaves may not receive any accumulated sick pay
but may be paid their accumulated vacation time during their
absence.

Moreover, a woman taking a maternity leave does not

retain her seniority for the purpose of bidding on a permanent
{wl;e~ .. s/~.

JS

read(

fC> re lt.~r-11 -fow~rl<)

position) although ·she is given priority over non-employees.
0~

she is rehired

fo ~a

permanent posiJion,

~he

J ·c.Js bacK_the

seniority she had accumulated before her maternity leave.
In this case, after respondent had her child, she attempted
to return to work.

She bid for three permanent permanent positions

but was outbid in each case by an employee who did not have
her seniority because her seniority is not restored until she
obtains a permanent position.
Respondent filed a complaint with the EEOC which eventually
issueda right to sue letter.

The district court found that

the petitioner's refusal to permit respondent to use her accumulated sick leave during her maternity leave and its refusal
to permit respondent to retain her seniority for the purpose
of bidding on a permanent position after her maternity leave
violated Title VII.

I

CA6 affirmed on the basis of an EEOC regulation.

'"k

3. Contentions. Petitioner contends that the decision of
CA6 conflicts with this Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,
4l?.u~s.

484 (1974), presents issues similar to those presented

----------------------. . ')'~29 C. F. R. § 160~. 10 (b)

provides in pertinent part: "(b) Disabi l 1t1es caused or contr1buted to by pregnancy • • • are, for all jobrelated purpos e s, temporary disabilities and should be treated as
such under any • o o sick leave plan available in connection with
employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and prac-

.

-3;

by Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, No. 74-1245 (cert.
granted, May 27, 1975), and raises distinct issues of fundamental importance in the administration of Title VII.

The basic

contention of petitioner is that Geduldig settled that "the exclusion of normal .pregnancy from a disability benefits plan
does not constitute sex based discrimination • • • • "

Petition

at 6.
4. Discussion.

Geduldig is not controlling because it

rested on an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
( $ 11 rt_'1 )

This casefwas distinguished by CA6 from Wetzel and from General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert and Gilbert v. General Electric Co.,
Nos. 74-1589 & 74-1590 (cert. granted October 6, 1975), and from
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Communications Workers
of America, No. 74-1601 (held for Gilbert) on the grounds that
petitioner, unlike the companies in those cases, has no disability
i~come

protection plan for its employees.

It is unclear

whether the plan at issue in Soc. Service Employees Union, Local
371 v. Women in City Gov. United, No. 75-70, and United Fed. of
Teachers v. Women in City Gov. United, No. 75-71, both being
held for Gilbert, is similar to that in AT&T.
followed Wetzel, Gilbert and AT&T

CA6, nevertheless,

in distinguishing Geduldig

and in following the EEOC guidelines.
This case is distinguishable from the granted cases
tices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of
leave, the availability of extensions, and accrual of seniority
and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment
under any • . • sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be
applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the
same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary
disabilities."

because the policy attacked is not a disaBLiicy income protection plan.

~ay

Instead, the only question is whether a pregnant
be denied the use of her accrued sick leave when

~

she is compelled to take a maternity leave or whether she
can use only her accrued vacation leave.

Whether this

petition is a hold for Gilbert or a possible grant and
consolidate depends on whether the distinctive features of
e.

the plan are crucial, and w1{her the Court w111 'hold that
the EEOC exceeded its grant of authority when it made a determination that pregnancy distinctions are sex-based distinctions.
If 29 C.F.R. §1604.10(b) is within the EEOC's authority,
the court of appeals' decision would appear to be correct.
Apparently, the petitioner-employer gave no justification
to CA6 for treating pregi........ nancy-related leaves differently from
other disability-related leaves with respect to retaining seniority for the purpose of bidding for a permanent position when
the employee is able to return to work or with respect to
use of accrued sick leave.
There is no response.
11/18/75

Murasky

Ops in petn appx.

January 7, 1977 Conf.
Heretofore held for Nos. 74-1589 and 74-1590, General Electric
v. Gilbert and Gilbert v. General Electric Co.

(3)
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, qo. 75-536 _ 6-. V.'/Petitioner company in this case has a policy that
pregnant employees who are on maternity leaves
may not receive any accumulated sick pay, although
such employees may be paid their accumulated
vacation time during this absence.
Further, an
employee taking a maternity leave does not retain
accumulated seniority for the purpose of bidding
on a permanent position (although priority is
given over non-emp~oyees). Once rehired for a
permanent position the employee gets back the
seniority accumulated prior to the maternity leave.
In this case , respondent, after having her child,
sought three permanent positions, but was outbid
i~ each
ase by an emplo ee who had less sen1ority
than responden woul
ave had · ha s e been g1ven
credit for her pre - maternity leave seniority .
She brought this suit claiming that the refusal
to allow her to use accumulated sick leave, as
well as the refusal to allow seniority for purposes
of bidding on a.permanent position at the conclusion
of the maternity leave, violated Title VII. The
District Court agreed, and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. The Sixth Circuit noted that this case

l

was different than Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wetzel, 511 F.2d 199 (CA 3 1975), vacated, 424 U.S.
737, AT&T, supra, and General Electric, in that
petitioner in this case had no disability benefits
·plan for its employees .
The Sixth Circuit did
agree with those cases both in distinguishing
Ge duldig and in following the EEOC guidelines. As
I see no reason to grant this case to consider
these factual twists until the lower courts have
had an opportunity to digest General Electric, I
will vote to grant, vacate, and remand for
reconsideration in light of General Electric.

Jlf.

Court ................... .
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· Circulated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~irculated:
NASHVILLE GAS COMPANY v. NORA D. SATTY
ON PETITION FOR WRIT 'OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-536. Decided January -, 1977

MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting.
The Court grants the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacates
the judgment below and remands the case for reconsideration
in light of our decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
U. S. L. W. - . Because the case involves an important
issue as to which Gilbert is unilluminating, I would simply
grant the petition.
As I understand our decision in Gilbert, it rests on the
simple factual proposition that the failure to include pregnancy in the health benefit plans provided by the General
Electric Co. for its employees has neither the purpose nor the
effect of discriminating against women. See Richmond Unified School District v. Berg, No. 75-1069 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Under petitioner's policy involved in this case, employees who take pregancy leaves lose their seniority for the
purpose oi"15Iactmg on permanent os1h ons. Smce' men do not
get pregnant, the po wy Impacts women differently than it
impacts men; and since, as a result of the policy, they may
not receive permanent positions, the policy has the effec of
disadvantaging womeu as com are wit their male coemployees m o taming jobs. A discriminatory effect IS thus
clearly shown liere. I would grant the petition anq consolidate this case with Richmond Unified School Board v. Berg,
~pra, for oral argument.
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January 19, 1977

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 75-536

-

Nashville Gas Compa ny v. Satty

Dear John:
When this case appears on the order list would you
please note the following:
"Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari
and set the case for argument. 11

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

...
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CHAMBERS OF"

January 19, 1977

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 75-536

-

Nashville Gas Company v. Satty

Dear John:
When this case appears on the order list would you
please note the following:
"Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari
and set the case for argument."

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

CHAMI!IERS Of"

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN • .JR.

January 19, 1977

RE: No. 75-536 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty
Dear Byron:
Please join me.

Sincerely,

v·

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

tlrt ~h .§taft~
1lhudtinghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll,?'l-c1

~ttprtnu <!fou.rt of

CHAMI!ERS 01'"

January 21, 1977

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 75-536, Nashville Gas Company v. Satty

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

4,#(.
T.M.
Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 21, 1977

Re:

75-536 - Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty
75-1069 - Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg

Dear Byron:
Although I do not read the General Electric
opinion the way you and those who have joined your
dissent do, I nevertheless am persuaded that we should
grant certiorari in these two cases.
Respectfully,

'•

.•'

~

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
. , ...
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No. 75-1069

Richmond Unified Schoo.l Dist.

~t. ~
. ·· ·~--------v_.
__s_o_n_j_a__L_y_n_n_B_e_r~g~~-------.
Nashville Gas Company v. Satty

~
~75-536

'·

Dear Byron:
Your dissenting opinions have persuaded
me. I now agree that we should grant petitions in
both of these cases and consolidate them for oral
argument.
,.·

dissents.

,.

In any event, please join me in your
Sincerely,

.•

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
~:
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No. 75-536, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty
This is dictated after reviewing the briefs in the above
case.

It is merely an ''aid to memory" rather than an analysis.

Any view expressed or implied is quite tentative.

* * * * *
Here on certiorari from CA6, this case was a "hold" for
Gilbert v. General Electric.

Although one of the issues decided

by CA6 is now controlled by GE (see below), the facts are sufficiently different to present an issue not necessarily controlled
by GE.
After complying with EEOC procedures, respondent -- a
clerk with Nashville Gas (petitioner) -- brought this suit under
Title VII alleging sex discrimination.

Respondent was granted

"pregnancy leave'' on December 29, 1972, 25 days before her child
was born.

Petitioner did not have a disability plan as such, but

did have a sick leave plan for the benefit of employees absent from
work due to non-occupational sickness or injury for a specified
number of days based on seniority.

When such an employee is able

to resume work, he or she customarily is returned to the job

No. 75-536

2.

previously held although the company does not concede any obligation
to hold jobs open for extended periods of time.

Moreover, an em-

ployee who returns to work from sick leave retains full seniority.
Pregnancy is not treated as sickness or injury under the
company's sick leave plan.

Rather, a pregnant employee is granted

a leave of absence that the company states is similar to leaves of
absence granted employees (apparently optionally) for causes other
than sickness or injury (e.g., to complete education).
Without checking the record more carefully, it is not clear
to me whether the company's policy with respect to treatment accorded
women returning from pregnancy leave is formalized. There is no dispute as to the treatment accorded respondent.

When she was placed

on pregnancy leave, her position was not filled in view of the converting of certain accounting functions to computers.

Some six weeks

after her child was born, the company did provide respondent with
temporary work for one month.

Thereafter, in order to collect unem-

ployment insurance, respondent requested the company to change her
employment status from pregnancy leave to termination, which the
company did (appendix 31).

Before she was terminated, and following

the birth of her child, respondent applied for three full-time
positions which became available.

In each case, a permanent female

employee with seniority was awarded the position, although if
respondent had retained her job-bidding seniority, she would have
been entitled to the position (appendix 33).
CA6 decided this case, affirming the DC's judgment in
favor of respondent, before Gilbert was decided.

It distinguished

No. 75-536

Geduldig.

3.

Respondent now concedes that "petitioner's sick leave

plan is for all intents and purposes
examined in Gilbert."

(Brief p.8.)

the same as the plan
Thus, denial of sick pay is

no longer an issue.
But respondent argues that "disparate treatment" in other
respects, following pregnancy, constitutes discrimination violative
of Title VII.

Respondent contrasts the difference in treatment

accorded employees who return from "sick leave" with the treatment
accorded a woman returning -- or attempting to return -- from
pregnancy leave.

In the former situation, the returnee is "generally"

placed in the same position, receives any pay raises that may have
taken effect during the absence, and is entitled to the same
seniority which he or she had earned prior to the absence (appendix 1719) •

A woman returning from pregnancy leave, however, is not
entitled to resume her prior position.

She is

"permitted

to return to work when a permanent position for which she is
qualified becomes available and when no employee then permanently
employed is bidding on the opening."
resp. brief p. 13.)

(Pet. brief p. 4; cf.

If a woman returning from pregnancy leave is

re-employed, she retains previously accumulated seniority with
respect to pensions, vacations, and certain other benefits.

She

does not retain "accumulated seniority for job-bidding purposes."
Petitioner views the issue as being limited to whether
failure to provide ''job-bidding" seniority constitutes sex discrimination.

Respondent views it somewhat more expansively:

whether the

4.

No. 75-536

total disparity of the treatment of employees returning from sick
leave and women returning from pregnancy leave constitutes unlawful
discrimination.

Respondent also argues that company policy is a

pretext to discriminate.
It is not clear to me, from a preliminary reading of the
briefs, whether respondent claims any right to re-employment
following pregnancy.

Apparently there is no such enforceable right

following sick leave, although
employ.

Apparently the company is not obligated to re-employ in

either case.

The essence of respondent's claim of discrimination

is loss of seniority (brief p.9).
accorded

company policy is to re-

Thus, if full sepiority had been

respondent when job vacancies occurred, she would have

been re-employed.
Petitioner argues, as would be expected, that the rationale
of Gilbert is controlling as to the seniority issue just as respondent
concedes it to be controlling as to sick pay itself.

If there is

no discrimination in classifying pregnancy differently for purposes
of sick pay, petitioner argues with a good deal of logic that there
can be no discrimination with respect to re-employment.
But the issue certainly is not free from doubt.
we granted certiorari because of this factual distinction.

Indeed,
I intend

to examine the briefs more carefully, and to re-read Gilbert and
Geduldig.
I also will welcome the thoughts of my clerk.
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Preliminary Memorandum
Conference for December 5, 1975
List 1, Sheet 3
Cert. to CA6 (Miller, Taylor (sitting
by designation)*

No. 75-536-CFX
NASHVILLE GAS CO.

Federal/Civil

v.

Timely

SAT'IY
1. Summaryo

Petitioner challenges CA6's invalidation of

two of its employment policies relating to the treatment of
pregnant women.
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*Judge Engel was listed as a member of the panel that heard
this case but he did not participate in the consideration of the
decision.
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BENCH MEMO
To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Sam Estreicher

Date: Sept. 30, 1977

No.75-536, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty;
No. 75-1069, Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg

I. THRESHOLD QUESTIONS
The threshold questions relate only to the Berg case.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction (
Petrsraise

$~ -1 ~ • c.Q....)

a number of technical arguments challenging the
~...

:we

-

DC's assumption of jurisdiction in this case. Chronology is
important here, and I offer the following table for your
guidance:
Nov. 15, 1975--Berg filed a charge with the EEOC.
Dec. 13, 1972--Petr school dist. 's governing bd approved a
proposed interim maternity leave policy.
Dec. 14, 1972--Berg notified petr that she was pregnant and
requested a pregnancy leave to begin February 23, 1973, one
month before expected due date.
Dec. 20, 1972--Berg submitted a further request supported
by a statement from her physician.
Dec. 27, 1972--School Dist. responded by requesting that
Berg submit to a physical examination by the school dist.
doctor.
Jan. 12, 1973--Berg's counsel requests "right to sue"
letter from EEOC.
February 5, 1973--Berg brought suit in DC, raising claims
under §§1981, 1983, 14th Amendment and Title VII, with
jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. §§1331, 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C.
§2000(e)-5(f)
February 8 1973--Berg moved for a prelim inj.
February 21, 1973--Berg received a "right to sue" letter.
February 22, 1973--DC granted resp's motion for a prelim
inj.
April 23, 1973--Berg filed a motion styled "Supplement to
Complaint".
June 8, 1973--DC granted Berg's "Supplement to Complaint."

2.
July 30, 1973--DC denied motion to aismiss on
jurisdictional grounds.
August 31, 1973--DC granted summary judgment and perm 1n].
December 14, 1973--DC granted judgment certifying class
action.
Petr argues that the DC lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the EEOC charge was filed prematurely,
42
....
,...

u.s.c.

§2000e-5(e); (2) the charge was not made under oath, id.
§2000e-5(b); and (3) resp instituted a Title VII action without
meeting the statutory prerequisite of receipt of a "right to

-------------------~

--------~----------~

sue" letter from the EEOC, id. §2000e-5(f).

CA9 affirmed the DC's assumption of jurisdiction on three,
alternative grounds.

(1) The DC had independent subject matter

jurisdiction to issue a prelim inj under 28

u.s.c.

§1343(3) and

§1983, in light of resp's substantial constitutional claim.

--

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974); Goosby v. Osser,
409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973).

(2) The DC had jurisdiction under

Title VII itself to issue a prelim inj pending disposition by
the EEOC of the underlying charge of discrimination. Drew v.
Liberty Mutual Insur. Co., 480 F.2d 69, 72-76 (CAS 1973). (3)
Finally, the later issuance of the "right to sue" letter
coupled with the filing of a supplemental complaint operated to
cure any initial jurisdictional defect. Henderson v. Eastern
Freight Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d 258, 260 (CA 4 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 912 (1973) .
In my view, ground (2) is inconsistent with the statutory
design, but it is unnecessary to the result. It would seem that
the D~ dict ~n ~ iss.:.!e t_::e prelim inj on the basis of

I

the §§1983, 1981 claims. The prelim inj issued on February 22,

1973, a day after resp received the "right to sue" letter, but

3.

apparently no motion was made at that time to amend or
supplement the complaint.

The February 22 inj was not premised

on Title VII jurisdiction (Petn, App. C, at 32), although
intervening §1983 cases in this Court (City of Kenosha v.
Bruno) led the DC to reexamine its §1983 jurisdiction and
develop the pendente lite theory as a post-hoc rationalization
(id. at 37). The other relief in the case was awarded after the
motion to supplement the complaint had been granted. Petr
offers no direct authority that under the circumstances, the DC
should have entered a formal dismissal and required
commencement of a new action.
B. Should Berg be "DIG'd"?
I am not "DIG"-happy, but I cannot understand why cert. was
granted in Berg. First, a Calif. statute effective January 1,
1976 requires that pregnancy be treated in the same fashion as
any other temporary disability for all job-related purposes.
(see Petn, App.D, at 52-53). Second, shortly before resp filed
her complaint in DC, petr had formulated an interim maternity
leave policy to replace what was an inflexible, LaFleur-like
policy. (The interim policy is set out at Petn, App.A, at 2-3).
This is not a case where the school district imposed a
mandatory maternity leave several months in advance of the
expected due date. As I read the record, petr school dist.
indicated that it might extend the 30-day period established in
the interim policy, but insisted that resp submit to an
examination by a school dist. physician. Resp refused to do so.
The maternity leave issue in this case boils to the question of
whether a school district may condition an extension of a

4.
30-day mandatory maternity leave upon submission to a physical
examination by the district's physician. Third, in addition to
the jurisdictional quagmire that I have just whizzed through,
the record is poorly developed at points. For example,
notwithstanding the DC's contrary finding (Petn, App.C, at 34),
I find it hard to disbelieve petr school dist.'s assertion that
it also subjects employees suffering certain non-pregnancy
disabilities to examination by its own physician. Fourth, the
maternity leave issue as present in this case is not
particularly interesting, and seems answered by dicta in
Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur (at least as a matter of
due process). The other issue in the case --denial of sick
leave pay-- is present in Nashville Gas.
II. THE MERITS
A. The Impact of Gilbert
The Nashville Gas and Berg cases turn, of course, on the
reach of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, No. 74-1589 (decided
December 7, 1976), 429 U.S. 125. There are many ways of reading
Gilbert. As in the poem of love, let me count the ways:
1. The uniqueness of pregnancy. There is much reliance in
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136, 139, and its intellectual forebear,
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417

u.s.

484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974), on the

view that pregnancy is different, because it is a
gender-specific condition as to which there is no comparable
class of males. Consequently, it might be argued, pregnancy
classifications can never constitute "sex discrimination" or
"discrimination based on sex."
This concept of uniqueness, however, cannot be taken to its

5.

logical extreme. I doubt whether the Court would uphold a
public school board's decision to discharge permanentl~a
teacher solely because of the onset of pregnancy. Refusals to
hire, rehire, train, promote, etc. solely on grounds of a
previous pregnancy similarly would be suspect. The law is
fairly clear that the fact that an employer's discriminatory
practice affects only a subclass of one sex does not bar a
finding of discriminatory purpose or effect. See, e.g.,
Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)

(refusal

to hire mothers of pre-school age children); Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (CA 7), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971)

(discharge of woman for getting married). These

cases did not involve a gender-specific condition, but I
believe they stand for broader proposition asserted above.
These practices, if perpetrated by public officials, would not
pass muster under "rational basis" scrutiny. See Cleveland
Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 634, 651 (1974)

(Powell,

J., concurring in the result). And, in my view, Gilbert does

not shield such practices.
2. An insurance, cost-justification case. At the other
extreme, there is the view, shared by resps in Nashville Gas
and Berg, that Gilbert is to be confined to its narrow facts.
Thus, Gilbert is said to hold that an employer's disability
insurance program which is underinclusive with respect to the

,,

risk of pregnancy is lawful under Title VII as a cost-justified

,,

employment practice.
Undoubtedly, this was the operative
,.....,.._....
setting for both Gilbert and Geduldig, and insurance concepts
pervade much of the discussion in both decisions. See Gilbert,

6.

429 U.S. at 130-31 & n.9, 134, 135-36, 138: Geduldig, 417 U.S.
at 493-97. While insurance concepts and cost considerations

~ were

~

~

important to the outcome of each case, and the absence of

these factors in a case might yield a different result, Gilbert
rests on a somewhat broader rationale.
3. Pregnancy classifications as not per se discriminatory,
whether in purpose or effect.

As I read Gilbert, the Court

held that classifications based on pregnancy -- a sex-specific
condition -- do not, without more, constitute sex-based
discrimination. Such classifications, standing alone, are
discriminatory neither in purpose nor effect, even though only
women are affected. A successful Title VII action requires an
independent showing of discriminatory purpose or disparate,
____..,.

~. . ______.. ~,...-,....

.......

,.....,

"""$

WE

,._,_-,--

detrimental impact on women. J. Rehnquist stated this point
with fair clarity:
We recognized in Geduldig, of course, that the fact that
there was not sex-based discrimination as such was not the
end of the analysis should it be shown "that distinctions
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an
invidious dLscrimination against the members of one sex on
the other.

*

*

*

*

Since gender-based discrimination had not been shown to
exist either by the terms of the plan or by its effect,
there was no need to reach the question of what sort of
standard would govern our review had there been such a
showing.
429 U.S. at 135 (emphasis supplied).
The Gilbert Court found no record support for a finding of
"pretext" or effect. As to the former, the exclusion of
pregnancy from insurance coverage did not constitute a sub rosa
sex discrimination because pregnancy is a unique disability.

~

~~-------'-------------

"But we have here no questions of excluding a disease or
disability comparable in all respects to covered diseases or

7.

disabilities and yet confined to the members of one race or
sex." 429

u.s.

at 136.

Similarly, "resps [had] not made the requisite showing of
gender-based effects," 429 U.S. at 137. "As there is no proof
that the package is in fact worth more to men than to women, it

~------------~----------~---~_.------~----------------------~----..
is impossible
to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in
this case simply because women disabled as a result of
pregnancy do not receive benefits •.•. " Id. at 138.
Now for the more difficult task of applying Gilbert to the
cases at hand. Nashville Gas and Berg present three

~fferent

practices: (1) denial of accumulated job-bidding senior1tyA (2)
denial of accumulated paid sick leave, and (3} a requirement of
mandatory maternity leave.
B. Denial of Accumulated Job-Bidding Seniority (Nashville Gas)
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, petr maintained an
essentially two-tier leave policy:

(1) "sick leave," and (2)

"leave 6f absence." (There may also have been a leave policy
for disability due to on-the-job injury, which is not pertinent
here). As to the former, the DC found, "defendant maintains a
policy of allowing leave in connection with non-work related
illness or injury without loss of seniority or other indicia of
good standing on the part of an employee where the non-work
related disability does not concern pregnancy. It is only in
the case of pregnancy that an employee is denied the
opportunity to take 'sick leave.'" (App. 44). As to the latter,
petr enforces a mandatory maternity leave policy (not directly
in issue in this case). While some provision is made for
reemployment of a returning mother on a temporary basis until a
low-seniority permanent position opens up and

)

8.

retention of seniority for purposes of vacations and pensions,

..

\\

-- -

the returning mother loses her job-bidding seniority and is
denied accumulated sick leave pay. Notwithstanding what seems
to be a contrary finding by the DC (App. 45), it appears that
employees seeking a leave for education, travel or other
personal, non-disability reason are treated in the same fashion
as pregnant women.
The DC held that Title VII had been violated because:
(1) only pregnant women are required to take leave and
thereby lose job bidding seniority and no leave is required
in other non-work related disabilities; and
(2) only pregnant women are denied sick leave benefits
while in all other cases of non-work related disability
sick leave benefits are available.
(App. 51).
The court also found that "[petr] has introduced no proof
of any business necessity in support of these discriminatory
policies. The court must therefore assume no justification
exists" (App. 51).
Petr contends that its policy is one of "favor[ing] those
employees who are actively working for the company at the time
a job opening becomes available to the detriment of those
employees on leave of absence, including maternity leave" (Br.
26), and that, unlike Gilbert, the impact of its practice does
not fall exclusively upon women (id. 24). In response to the
argument that this justification does not explain the
differential treatment accorded employees with other
non-occupational disabilities, petr falls back on Geduldig's
characterization of pregnancy as a "voluntary" condition, not a
true disability. "[A]n employer may rationally favor those
employees who do not absent themselves for education, travel or

9.

other reasons of personal preference over those who do so
absent themselves. Such absences are disruptive and need not be
encouraged by the employer. (Reply Br. 3).
Petr's justification is certainly not without reason, but I
doubt whether it rises to the level of "business necessity"

\

needed to overcome a prima facie Title VII case. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401

u.s.

424 (1971). I say this because the policy

is not based on cost or efficiency considerations. Indeed, it
would usually cut against efficiency to hire or promote an
inexperienced employee over a senior worker. At bottom, petr's
to reward
concern is an "ideological" one: he wants/employees who exhibit
loyalty and do not take leaves for personal junkets. This type
not

of rationale is ordinarily/thought sufficient to justify a
disparate impact on a protected class. See, e.g., Sprogis v.
United Air Line, Inc.

It also offends my common sense to

equate absence on account of pregnancy with leaves for travel
and education. The condition of pregnancy may be voluntarily
---..,......assumed in the first instance, but, as implicitly recognized by
petr's own mandatory maternity policy (App. 43), at some point
that condition ripens into a genuine disability.
The question then becomes whether resp Satty has made out a
prima facie cases consistent with Gilbert. It must be
remembered that the decisions were below were handed down prior
to Gilbert, and the courts proceeded on the assumption that the
usual Title VII principles would apply to pregnancy
classifications.
Although resp and amici make the argument that petr's
policy is merely a "pretext" for stereotypical thinking about

10.

female employees (e.g., that their devotion to the job
terminates with the onset of pregnancy, or that their need for
employment ceases with the birth of children). I do not think
that the record supports this position. The argument here is
that there is a complete absence of justification for a policy
which is irrational and overbroad. A woman on mandatory
maternity leave loses here job-bidding seniority "regardless of
the length of her absence, and regardless of whether her
absence was solely due to disability or included some period
when she could have worked but preferred, for personal reasons
including care of the infant, to remain at home." (AFL-CIO and
UAW as Amici Br.l6). Of course, the absence of a reasonably
plausible justification can be evidence of improper motivation,
cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1966); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1969). But I doubt whether a finding
of pretextual sex-based discrimination can be squared with the
fact that petr has asserted a plausible, if ultimately
unpersuasive, justification, that employees returning from
maternity leave receive temporary employment until a permanent

-

position opens up and retain vacation and pension seniority,
and that female employees are present in petr's workforce and
in this case were the immediate beneficiaries of resp Satty's
loss of job-bidding seniority.

~

d.••+·--~
~

I am inclined, however, to think that a classification

~~._
~~·--...J
(mandatory) maternity leave presents a prima facie case of ---

denying job-bidding seniority to women returning from a

disparate impact under Gilbert. Since the facts were developed

11.
in a pre-Gilbert setting, the briefs do not offer aggregate
statistics, setting forth, in some systematic fashion, the
impact of the denial of job-bidding seniority on petr's female
workforce. I am not sure such a showing is essential in this
case. Unlike Griggs, we can be certain that the employer's
maternity leave policy impacts only women. And unlike Gilbert,
female employees as a class are likely to suffer an aggregate
detriment, in terms of their relative seniority position
vis-a-vis male employees. Moreover, some women may be
discouraged from returning to their jobs because of the
prospect of having to bid for low-seniority positions. There is
support for the conclusion that petr's policy "is in fact worth
more to men than to women," Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138, and that
it has "worked to discriminate against an identifiable group or
class," Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496. Thus, petr's failure
demonstrate "business

nec~ssity"

dooms the job-bidding

seniority restriction.
It is true that non-pregnant female employees will
themselves suffer no detriment, and indeed women replaced resp
in two positions which she would have gotten had she not been
deprived of her job-bidding seniority. However, Gilbert need
not be read as declaring "an 'anything goes' approach to
personnel policies regarding pregnancy" (ACLU Br. 29), simply
because there will always be a subset of women who are not
disadvantaged by the particular policy. Although I think a
prima facie case can be presumed on the record of this case,
the Court may wish to remand for further factual development on
the question of whether petr's female employees have suffered,

...

12.
in the aggregate, a disadvantage relative to petr's male
workforce.
ACLU, as amicus, also argues that EEOC regulations on the
seniority issue are entitled to deference because, unlike the
portion of the regulations effectively disregarded in Gilbert,
the EEOC has consistently taken the view that pregnancy
classifications impinging seniority rights violate Title VII,
and that other federal agencies have not taken a contrary view
(ACLU Br. 30-33). Petr disputes this characterization (Reply
Br. 7-11), but some of the quotations referred to by petr belie
its position (see, e.g., p. 11).
I have not discussed the "vested rights" concept, because I
do not think it withstands analysis. Seniority or sick leave
pay is no more "vested" than income insurance. They are all
terms or conditions of employment, obtained either through the
unilateral largesse of the employer or individual or collective
negotiations, defined by the limitations arrived at in the
employment agreement, and subject to revision or even
elimination in future agreements.
C. Denial of Accumulated Paid Sick Leave (Nashville Gas; Berg)
1. The Nature of the Plans. The Nashville Gas sick leave
plan is, in effect, a substitute for a disability insurance
plan (App. 13). Employees "earn" a given number of sick leave
days for use in the future, depending on how long they remain
continuously employed, and how often they use sick leave while
employed. An employee may not accumulate unused sick leave from
one year to the next. But for each year he uses no sick leave,
he can add one week of full pay leave, up to double the full

13.
pay to which he is otherwise entitled (App. 97). Apparently,
unused sick leave cannot be applied to vacation time. Pregnant
employees can draw upon their sick leave until "pregnancy
leave" commences.
The plan in Berg follows Calif. Educ. Code §13468 which
essentially provides an entitlement of "10 days' leave of
absence for illness or injury" for every full-time employee,
with accumulation of unused leave from one year to the next.
Pursuant to Calif. Educ. Code §13456, which

states that the

section does not require school boards to grant sick leave pay
to pregnant teachers, petrs in Berg adopted a policy of denying
sick leave to employees who are not working as a result of the
mandatory maternity leave then in effect.
2. Similarity to Gilbert. A pregnancy classification with
respect to sick leave pay is very close to the facts in Gilbert.

,...

The employer's interest in avoiding the cost of coverage
for pregnancy -- to limit the number of occasions that may give
rise to paid sick leave liability -- is similar to GE's in
Gilbert. However, there are differences. Generally speaking,
actuarial crite r ia of risk selection govern disability
insurance, not sick leave policies. Moreover, as the AFL-CIO
and UAW point out in their amici brief in Nashville Gas,
Gilbert plan did not set an absolute limit set upon the number
of sick days that could be taken in one year, but, rather,
limited the number of days for which payments would be made for
any single disability. See 429 U.S. at 128. In the Nashville
Gas plan, by contrast, there is little likelihood that female
employees will receive an extra benefit on account of

JA

VI
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pregnancy, because the employer sets

~

ceiling governing the

allowance for each employee (Amici Br. 30-31). The Calif. plan
in Berg has a similar structure, although the school board is
given discretion to increase the allowance in a particular case.
A disparate impact argument is more difficult to make in
this context than in the case of denial of job-bidding
seniority. As in Gilbert, men and women are likely to incur
roughly the same number of reimubursible disabilities over the
course of a year. Therefore, exclusion of pregnancy coverage,
standing alone, does not disadvantage female employees as a
class. On the other hand, at least in Nashville Gas, inclusion
of pregnancy "does not destroy the presumed parity of the
benefits accruing to men and women alike,. which results from
the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks." Gilbert, 429 U.S.
at 139 & n.l7 (emphasis in original).
3. Viewing the employer's maternity policy as a whole.
Resps in both cases argue that any perceived similarity between
the sick leave plans in Nashville Gas and Berg and the Gilbert
situation disappears when the denial of paid sick leave is
viewed in the context of the employer's maternity policy as a
whole. In part, this a "pretext" argument. Resp in Berg makes
much of the inconsistent posture of the school board -treating pregnancy as a disability for purposes of mandatory
maternity leave, while denying disability status for purposes
of sick leave pay. And resps in both cases stress the
stereotypical thinking underlying their respective employer's
overall policy.

I do not think that the Court will deem

inconsistency in the labeling of pregnancy to be sufficient

\
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proof of "pretext." Nor does the record support the view that
the policies in Nashville Gas and Berg ' are explainable soley by
reference to invidious stereotyping of female employees. The
Be£9. plan also involves a one-day, "have a cigar" paternity
leave. This is undeniably unjust, but hardly a linchpin for
establishing discriminatory intent. The employer has an easy
answer: a one-day leave is simply not as expensive as a
pregnancy leave of several months' duration.

-

The better argument here -- one which is not clearly made
in any of the briefs and which may require a remand for factual

--

development -- is that, as a factual matter, female employees
in the aggregate will receive less compensation than the class
of male employees because a significant number of the former,
but not the latter, must endure forced discontinuity of work
without sick leave pay. (I believe J. White made this point in
his dissent from the initial vote to deny cert. in Berg). I
would add that inclusion of pregnancy will not lead to "unjust
enrichment" of female employees as a class, because the paid
sick leave ceilings will remain the same notwithstanding the
inclusion of pregnancy as a reimbursible disability. Moreover,
the employer's cost justification is somewhat more attenuated
than in Gilbert because he has presumably budgeted for the
allowable number of sick leave payments. And the employer's
interest in continuity of employment is undercut by his
willingness to permit disability leave generally.
D. Mandatory Maternity Leave (Berg)
As a theoretical matter, mandatory maternity leave policies
should be subject to Title VII scrutiny, in terms of the

16.
disparate impact analysis outlined above. Women are more likely
than men to be subject to mandatory leave and thereby suffer
relative loss of pay and other benefits (see J. White's dissent
from the initial vote to deny cert. in Berg).
However, in the Berg case, the school district's interim
policy, which became effective before resp brought suit in DC,
established a flexible 30-day maternity leave, subject to
extension upon a showing that an employee can continue working
beyond that point without endangering health or interfering
with job performance. Resp's challenge is reduced to (1) an
attack on the requirement of

a~y

mandatory maternity leave at

all, and (2) petr school district's decision to condition an
upon submission to
extension in resp's case I a medical examination by petr's
physician.
Petrs' policy would seem to satisfy a "business necessity"
test. The interim policy provides for an individualized
determination of disability or fitness to teach. Petrs'
insistence that resp submit to an examination by the school
board's doctor follows the suggestion made by way of dictum in
Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur. The LaFleur Court noted
that school boards "could require the pregnant teacher to
submit to medical examination by a school board physician." 414

u.s.

at 647 n.l4. The failure to require a similar procedure

with respect to other disabilities --a point which petr does
not concede (Petrs' Br. 44), but which the DC decided against
petr (Petn, App. C, at 34)-- would seem a justifiable
classification in light of the fairly widespread, but by no
means consensus, medical opinion concerning the disabling

17.
effect of pregnancy on a teacher's

performance during the

jo~

last few weeks of a pregnancy. LaFleur, 414

u.s.

at 647 n.l3;

see petrs' evidence on this point (App. 56). And few other
disabilities are as identifiable and as predictable as
pregnancy. In this sense, pregnancy is unique. This also
answers the contention that pregnant women are the only
employees who are forced to take a mandatory leave even though
the woman and her doctor believes she is physically capable of
working up to the expected due date. Putting to aside the DC's
contrary finding, I would think that employers often require
employees to undergo a company-doctor examination, and on
occasion such an examination can result in a mandatory leave of
absence. It would seem that resp's real complaint is with the
the routine nature of petr's requirement in the case of
pregnancy.
E. The Desirability of a Remand?
Since both cases were decided before Gilbert, when the
courts fairly uniformly held, following the EEOC regulations on.
point, that any disability plan which treated pregnancy
differently than other disabilities is

~

se violative of

Title VII, the Court may wish to vacate and remand for further
factual development. Gilbert rejects any

~

se approach, and

requires the plaintiff to show that the plan under attack has
the effect, in the aggregate, of providing greater benefits for
men than for women. Such a factual showing in terms does not
seem to be present in either Nashville Gas or Berg. While I
think aggregate disadvantage to female employees can be
presumed in the case of a mandatory maternity leave policy

il·~ ...
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which denies affected female employees job-bidding seniority
'

and paid sick leave, the Court may find a remand for factual
development appropriate. A reversal, however, would not be in
order. In Gilbert, the Court reversed in the absence of the
requisite showing of discriminatory purpose or effect. There,
the record evidence showed that actual benefits provided to
women and the cost of those benefits were equal to or greater
than the benefits, and the attendant cost, to men. See 429 U.S.
at 130 & n.9. Here, the inferences from the record are to the
contrary.
III. CONCLUSION
I think a DIG is appropriate in No. 75-1069, Richmond
Unified School Dist. v. Berg. In any event, I believe the DC
had jurisdiction to issue the prelim inj. And I would affirm on
the sick leave issue but reverse and remand on the mandatory
maternity leave question.
With respect to No. 75-536, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, I
would affirm on both seniority and sick leave pay.

S.E.

75-536

NASHVILLE GAS CO. v. SATTY

Argued 10/5/77
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Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Sam Estreicher
Date: October 6, 1977
Re: No. 75-536, Nas hville Gas Co. v. Sat·ty; .
Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg

o. 75-1069,/

I omitted to mention in my bench memorandum that
Con gress is pres ently considering bills to overrule General
Electic 'Co. v. Gilbert.

The Senate has reported

out of committee S. 955, which amends Section 701 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) to define the
terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" to
include "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions," and provides that "women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated f he same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work . .. . "

The intent of the Senate Comm. on Human

Resources (which I believe is the old Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare) is a broad one, to eradicate
the concept of "uniqueness" underlying this Court's
decisions in Aiello and Gilbert.

S. Rep. 95-331, 95th

Cong . , 1st Sess. (July 6, 1977).
The Senate referred S.995 to the House, but the
House has decided to work on its own bill, H.R. 5055.
This bill has not yet been reported out of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor.
I am not .suggesting mootness, but the likelihood
of Congressional action makes a Sup. Ct. decision in these
cases less pressing than before.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR.

October 17, 1977

RE: No. 75-536 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty
Dear Lewis:
The vote in the above is unanimous on the issue of loss
of seniority for promotional purposes but 6 to 3 on the
question of sick leave. Thurgood, you and I are to Affirm
and our 6 colleages to Reverse. If a dissent is indicated
after Bill Rehnquist circulates his opinion would you be
interested in taking it on?
Sincerely,

!/z{~

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Mr. Justice Marshall

October 17, lfl77

Oea!" Bi 1 r:

· Thank you for note about the above case.
As you suggest, if a dissent is ndicat~d after
B'll Rehnquist circulates his opinion, I w 11 be glad to
draft one.
.,,.

Sincerely,
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Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss '"'
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cc:

Mr. .Just ice ' Marsha
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CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

October 28, 1977

Re:

No. 75-536 - Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference
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CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

October 28, 1977

/

I

No. 75-536, Nashville Gas v. Satty
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,
/J ..
'.
~

\

"

~,
,_.

/
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

October 31, 1977

Re:

No. 75-536

-

Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

//«4
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc:

The Conference

